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Socioeconomic Declinism and Right-Wing Populist Support
Abstract
This paper focuses on resolving the false dichotomy between the economic grievance and cultural
backlash theses commonly presented in the literature on Right-Wing Populist attitude formation. It
elaborates on Gidron and Hall’s social integration thesis by introducing the socioeconomic declinism
thesis, which combines social, cultural, and economic factors when measuring Right-Wing populist
attitudes. The interaction between the cultural backlash, social integration, and economic grievance
theories provides a more holistic account of why right-wing populist attitudes form. This study pulls from
the European Social Survey Round 8 to conduct a large-N statistical analysis of two compiled indices—the
socioeconomic integration index and the right-wing populist attitude index. Findings reveal a correlation
between feelings of socioeconomic decline and right-wing populist attitudes. Determining why people
formulate sympathy to populist ideas and leaders can help to dismantle populist support and reintegrate
marginalized individuals into society without demonizing an outgroup.
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Socioeconomic Declinism and Right-Wing Populist Support
Kayley Rettberg
Abstract
This paper focuses on resolving the false dichotomy between the economic grievance and
cultural backlash theses commonly presented in the literature on Right-Wing Populist attitude
formation. It elaborates on Gidron and Hall’s social integration thesis by introducing the
socioeconomic declinism thesis, which combines social, cultural, and economic factors when
measuring Right-Wing populist attitudes. The interaction between the cultural backlash, social
integration, and economic grievance theories provides a more holistic account of why right-wing
populist attitudes form. This study pulls from the European Social Survey Round 8 to conduct a
large-N statistical analysis of two compiled indices—the socioeconomic integration index and
the right-wing populist attitude index. Findings reveal a correlation between feelings of
socioeconomic decline and right-wing populist attitudes. Determining why people formulate
sympathy to populist ideas and leaders can help to dismantle populist support and reintegrate
marginalized individuals into society without demonizing an outgroup.
Introduction
The ideology of populism is at its core a divisive one. It is centered on an “us versus
them” rhetoric that characterizes the people as an in-group and identifies outgroups as enemies
(Mudde, 2004). Populism exists on both ends of the ideological spectrum. Right-wing populism
in particular, capitalizes on anti-immigrant, nativist values calling for a return to the glory days
where the mythical “people” held power, emphasizing reactionary nostalgia (Muller, 2016; Betz,
1993).
Populist ideologies appeal to people who feel marginalized from society particularly on
cultural and economic grounds (Gidron & Hall, 2018). Capitalizing on this sentiment, populist
leaders incite emotional responses and gain quick support, rallying supporters to view them as
the “savior.” For this reason, a growing number of scholars assert that populism is at its core
exclusionary, illiberal, and anti-pluralist. Therefore, the rise of the populist radical right
contributes significantly to the democratic recession and political apathy (Schmuck & Matthes,
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2017; Muller, 2016). Determining why people formulate sympathy to populist ideas and leaders
can help to dismantle populist support and reintegrate marginalized individuals into society
without demonizing an outgroup.
This study will focus on how feelings of socioeconomic marginalization affect populist
attitude formation, specifically whether feelings of “socioeconomic declinism” lead to higher
levels of right-wing populist support among individuals. Socioeconomic declinism is an attempt
to bridge the false dichotomy traditionally drawn between economic, cultural, and social factors
as causal mechanisms for populist support by accounting for all of these factors at once.
Hopefully, this will lead to a more nuanced understanding of populist attitude formation that
allows this study to answer the question, how do feelings of socioeconomic declinism affect
populist support?
Literature Review and Theory
Cas Mudde defines populism as, “An ideology that considers society to be ultimately
separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt
elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people”
(2004, 543).

On the radical right, this usually takes the form of anti-elite sentiment,

authoritarianism, and nativism (Mudde, 2004; Muller, 2016). Populism is inherently a “thin
ideology,” meaning that it must syncretize with another ideology to provide a complete
worldview and prescription for action. This helps to explain the existence of right-wing and
left-wing populisms (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2014; Ivaldi, Lanzone, & Woods 2017; Muller, 2016;
Mudde, 2004; Stanley, 2008). Another key component of populism is the moralistic dimensions.
Essentially, this means that the ingroup is characterized by holding the moral high ground and
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the out-group is characterized as morally inferior (Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove 2014;
Hawkins, 2009; Mudde, 2004). By characterizing the outgroup as morally inferior, populists fuel
division. This division is also in part due to the ex negativo c haracterizing the ingroup. Populists
define the ingroup not by its own characteristics, but by stating that it is what the outgroup is not,
resulting in scapegoating of the out-groups and valorization of the in-group (Mudde, 2004;
Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013; Muller, 2016). These characteristics render populism an ideology of
exclusion.
In determining what factors motivate right-wing populist attitudes, two primary schools
of thought prevail. The first is the cultural backlash thesis and the second is the economic
grievance thesis (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Essentially, the cultural backlash thesis purports that
individuals are prone to populist ideologies when they feel that their culture is threatened by the
New Left ideas generated in the Silent Revolution. This perceived threat leads to a backlash
response in the form of adopting right-wing populist ideas, in an effort to preserve the “pure
people” (Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Muller, 2016; Schmuck & Matthes, 2017; Eatwell &
Goodwin, 2018). For right-wing populist parties, an example of this is the appeal to
anti-immigrant sentiments (Charitopoulou & Garcia-Manglano, 2017; Schmuck & Matthes,
2017). The economic grievance thesis, on the other hand, places primacy on perceptions of
economic marginalization (Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Lechler, 2019). In her analysis of
right-wing populist support for anti-globalization policies, Marie Lechler uses employment
shocks to show how economic destabilization makes individuals more prone to populist support
(2019).

105

Some of the earliest work on contemporary right-wing populism highlighted economic
grievances and resentments generated among the so-called “losers of modernization.”
Essentially, this theory proposed that the individuals most harmed by economic globalization and
modernization would be the most prone to adopting populist ideologies (Betz 1993). This theory
is also framed in terms of economic modernization more generally, particularly with the shift
away from a production-based economy to a service economy. The empirical economic shift also
creates a shift in values to “post-modernist values,” which can create a devaluing of production
based jobs (Arwine & Mayer, 2013; Marks, Attewell, Rovny, & Hooghe, 2017).
Empirical findings on this source of economic grievance have been mixed and generally
less robust than cultural variables (Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Mudde, 2007; Mudde, 2009). For
example, Inglehart and Norris found that backlash against cultural change was a stronger driving
factor of populist attitudes than economic insecurity (2016). This version of a much older
modernization approach to understanding the rise of fascism has become so deeply ingrained in
the popular and scholarly understandings of right-wing populism that many studies simply
assume that those who support right-wing populist ideas and parties are hurting or perceive
themselves as hurting economically. It would appear that the actual reasons are more complex.
Mudde even contends that the economy is often a secondary issue for populists, falling behind
the core notions of nativism, authoritarianism, and anti-elitism, suggesting a departure from the
traditional understanding of the left-right spectrum (2007). For these reasons, bridging the
dichotomous understanding of the cultural backlash and economic grievance theses may be the
most useful in determining populist attitudes.
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In an attempt to reexamine the economic grievance thesis, scholars developed the relative
economic deprivation thesis. Relative economic deprivation is the perception individuals hold
that their economic situation, regardless of actual socioeconomic status, is worse off than their
peers, particularly due to structural inequalities and how valued an individual feels in society
(Elchardus & Spryut, 2016; Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018; Gaffney, Hackett, Rast, Hohman, &
Jaurique, 2018). On the other hand, declinism focuses on the perception of the functionality of
the economy as a whole. When people feel that society is on the decline, culturally and
economically, they are more susceptible to populist sympathy (Antonucci, Horvath, Kutiyski, &
Krouwel, 2019; Elchardus and Spryut 2016). Effectively, relative deprivation is the perception of
the individual’s status, and declinism is the perception that an individual holds about the
direction of the economy overall.
Relative deprivation theory is stronger than the traditional economic grievance theory as
it accounts for perceptions of economic deprivation, encapsulating feelings of wrong-doing by
traditional socio-economic institutions a nd helping to explain why populist parties continue to
thrive even when the economy is prospering (Elchardus and Spryut 2016; Mols and Jetten 2016).
Frank Mols and Jolanda Jetten argue that right-wing populist parties twist rhetoric to lead voters
to believe that “objective relative gratification” is actually relative deprivation (2016). The
upshot of this is that even people who hold objectively high socioeconomic statuses may
sympathize with populism so long as they feel that they are not as well off as they should be.
Gidron and Hall offer a more nuanced view and potential resolution of this debate with
their social integration thesis, arguing that individuals are more prone to populist ideologies
when they feel socially marginalized. The traditional understanding of the cultural backlash and
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economic grievance theses as competing theories presents a false dichotomy, neglecting
important insights into the factors behind populist support. Accounting for the fact that economic
grievance interacts with cultural insecurities and understandings captures the individual’s
perspective that they have been “left-behind” by traditional political, cultural, and economic
structures, alienating them to the populist margins (Antonucci et. al, 2019; Gidron & Hall, 2018;
Hochschild, 2016; Gest, 2016; Wuthnow, 2018). Antonucci et. al argue that the “left-behind”
feelings stem primarily from economic declinism (2019). Declinism can be expressed in a
“nostalgic deprivation,” where individuals desire a return to a (mythical) time when
socioeconomic conditions were believed to be more promising and there was a cultural
consensus that valued who they were and what they did. For right-wing populists, this usually
refers to a time of greater homogeneity of “the people” (Marks et. al, 2017; Elchardus & Spruyt,
2016; Arwine & Mayer, 2013). Individuals feeling nostalgic deprivation often have dismal hopes
for the future (Gest, Reny, & Mayer, 2018; Gidron & Hall, 2018). The left-behind thesis
elaborated by Gidron and Hall bridges the divide between the cultural backlash and economic
grievance theories, resulting in a more encompassing thesis (2018).
In order to have a complete understanding of populist attitude formation, this research
seeks to build on Gidron and Hall’s attempt at solving the false dichotomy of the cultural
backlash and economic grievance theses by introducing the socioeconomic declinism thesis. The
socioeconomic declinism thesis suggests that due to the complexity and nuance in people’s lives,
it is impossible to achieve a complete and accurate understanding of right-wing populist attitude
formation without examining cultural factors, social integration, and relative economic
deprivation together. U
 nlike Gidron and Hall, this theory utilizes subjective economic measures
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rather than empirical ones. Gidron and Hall use economic markers like income, occupation, and
comfortability with income, which do not measure subjective perceptions of economic well
being (2018). That being said, as noted earlier, subjective economic factors are more successful
at explaining Right-Wing populist attitude formation (Antonucci et. al, 2019; Elchardus &
Spryut, 2016; Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018; Gaffney et. al, 2018). The socioeconomic declinism
thesis accounts for this and will examine subjective markers of economic well-being. Based on
the development of the socioeconomic declinism thesis, the following hypothesis can be formed:
Hypothesis: As feelings of socioeconomic declinism increase, populist support will also
increase.
Research Design and Methodology
This paper will use a large-N statistical analysis of the European Social Survey (ESS)
Round 81. By utilizing individual survey data across all of the countries surveyed by the ESS2,
the analyses produced will be generalizable and account for right-wing populist attitude
formation across Europe. Unfortunately, the cross-national nature of this study limits the amount
of cultural nuance captured. Since the sample consists of cases from all of the European nations
surveyed in the ESS Round 8, the individual conditions of every country are not controlled for.
The sample size is 44,349 survey responses.
The dependent variable is right-wing populist support, operationalized as support for
right-wing populist ideas, rather than electoral support for parties or leaders. This is measured
through an additive index combining ESS survey questions that assess an individual respondent’s

The ESS is an international academic survey conducted every two years. It catalogs information on social, cultural,
and economic conditions in Europe to track changes over time. The data collected is highly trusted among scholars.
2
Countries Included: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, United
Kingdom, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian
Federation, Sweden, and Slovenia.
1
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attitudes towards the core populist concepts of nativism, anti-elitism, and authoritarianism.
Appendix A provides a complete list of questions included in the index. Correlational analysis
tested the degree and direction of individual measures. These findings suggest that the question
items cohere in the ways predicted in the literature, creating a valid measure of the concept. By
combining multiple questions on the various core topics, this study accounts for the multi-faceted
appeal of right-wing populism.
The independent variable, socioeconomic declinism, is also constructed as an additive
index that particularly captures perceptions of socio-economic well-being, including social
declinism, cultural anxieties, and relative economic deprivation. The index intentionally leaves
out questions regarding an individual’s actual socioeconomic status, because relative economic
deprivation is concerned with perceptions. The index includes questions falling into three
categories; social, cultural, and economic. Once again, correlational analysis confirmed that the
degree and direction of the individual measures cohered in line with the literature. Please see
Appendix B for a complete list.
This study will control for income to capture individuals’ empirical socioeconomic status.
Appendix C has a complete list of control variables. Income in particular was an important
control, because the social integration index aims to capture only an individual’s perceptions of
their economic deprivation and social declinism, which makes their empirical socio-economic
status less relevant. That being said, one might expect there to be some independent relationship
between socio-economic status and populist attitudes. Other controls have been identified in the
literature as independent drivers of right wing populist support (e.g. age, education, gender, and
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rural residence), and so they are included in the OLS regression model presented here as
controls.
This study will use SPSS statistical software to run an OLS linear regression model on
the dependent variable, Right-Wing Populist support. Using an OLS linear regression model
allows this study to analyze how each variable interacts with the dependent variable while
holding all other variables constant. This shows which variables have a stronger effect on the
dependent variable
Findings and Analysis
Before setting up the regression model for Right-Wing populist attitudes, this study
conducted a bivariate correlational analysis of the variables. Conducting a bivariate analysis first
allows this study to see the direction of the relationship between each variable and which
independent (Socioeconomic integration) or control variables correlate with the dependent
variable (Right-Wing populist attitudes).
Table One shows the bivariate correlations between the variables. At the bivariate level,
the socioeconomic declinism index and the Right-Wing populist attitude index correlated at
-.599, which was the strongest correlation between the variables. This indicates that at the
bivariate level, the less socially integrated one feels, the more likely that individual is to hold
Right-Wing populist attitudes. Another interesting correlation is the correlation ideology and
Right-wing populist attitudes. This correlation was not significant and was also negative, when
we would have expected it to be significant and positive, suggesting that Right-Wing populist
ideas do not appeal to individuals based on traditional liberal-conservative lines. This is not
entirely surprising, as research suggests that Right-Wing populist ideas appeal to individuals
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from the Old-Left as well as the far right, which may explain the lack of significance in this
correlation (Arewine & Mayer, 2013). Similarly, gender had an insignificant correlation as well
and also correlated in the negative direction when it was expected to correlate positively. This
suggests that contrary to the popular assumption that women are inherently “less Right-Wing
populist than men are,” while women may be less likely to vote for Right-Wing populist parties
and leaders, they are just as likely to hold Right-Wing populist attitudes as men are. Simply put,
being a woman does not inherently serve as a firewall against Right-Wing populist ideologies
(Spierings & Zaslove, 2015).
Table One
Bivariate Correlation Matrix of Variables
Variable

Populist
Attitudes

Socioeconomic
Integration

Socioeconomic
Integration (IV)

-.599*
.000

Gender
(0=F, 1=M)

-.008
.105

.099*
.000

Ideology
(1-10 scale,
10=Most Right
1=Most Left)

-.008
.117

.055*
.000

.044*
.000

Education
(0=Under
Tertiary,
1=Tertiary or
Above)

-.180*
.000

.183*
.000

-.040*
.000

-.032*
.000

Income (by
decile)

-.203*
.000

.267*
.000

.086*
.000

.051*
.000

.301*
.000

Urban or
Non-Urban
(0=Urban,
1=Non-Urban)

.039*
.000

-.024*
.000

.002
.647

.007
.152

-.142*
.000

*Correlation is significant at the .01 level.

Gender

Ideology

Education

Income

-.053*
.000

N=44,349
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Table Two shows the results from the OLS linear regression model. Even after
accounting for the influence of the other control variables, socioeconomic integration correlated
the strongest, with a Beta value of -.575. Even when controlling for income (Beta value -.031),
socioeconomic integration held strong, suggesting that it is, in fact, subjective measures of
economic security that matter towards individuals’ formation of right wing populist attitudes
more so than empirical measures of economic security. The second strongest Beta value was
education at -.067, which is in line with the literature that education is a highly important factor
in the formation of Right-Wing populist attitudes. That being said, socioeconomic integration
had a much higher beta value, suggesting that the cultural, social, and subjective economic
factors are the primary drivers. The adjusted r2 value was .358, which means that the linear
regression model accounts for 35.8% of the variance. According to this model, it is possible to
reject the null hypothesis, as a relationship exists between socioeconomic integration and
Right-Wing populist attitudes.
Table Two
OLS Regression Model of Right Wing Populist Attitude Formation
Variable

Unstandardized B

Standard Error

Beta

Significance

Urban/Non-Urban

.291

.224

.013*

.000

Education

-1.555

.098

-.067*

.003

Gender

1.080

.110

.053*

.000

Ideology

.091

.020

.020*

.000

Income

-.116

.018

-.031*

.000

Socioeconomic
Integration

-.835

.007

-.575*

.000

*Significant at the .01 level.

Adjusted r2 = .358

N=44,349
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Conclusion
The traditional compartmentalization of theories regarding Right-Wing populist attitude
formation into the cultural grievance or economic backlash schools of thought has neglected to
capture the nuance with which individuals formulate their political opinions. By developing the
Socioeconomic Declinism thesis, this study has introduced nuance into the conversation
surrounding Right-Wing populist attitude formation. The regression model shows that even when
accounting for control variables like income, socioeconomic integration had the greatest effect
on an individual’s attitude formation. This allows us to accept the hypothesis that greater feelings
of socioeconomic decline will lead to higher levels of Right-Wing populist support.
Looking forward, this research presents a few areas for exciting future research. In the
future, it would be useful to control for the country by creating a dummy variable for each
country and including them as controls. This would help capture some of the cultural nuances
that can not be expressed without doing so. It would also be interesting to conduct the same
study in the United States (controlling for race, of course), to see if Right-Wing populism in the
US has a similar appeal to that in Europe. It would also make for interesting research to look
more deeply into the relationship between gender, ideology, and Right-Wing populist attitudes,
as those relationships were fairly unexpected for this research.
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Appendix A: Dependent Variable: Right-Wing Populist Attitudes Score
Questions Included in Right-Wing Populist Attitude Score
Category
Nativism

Anti-Elitism

Authoritarianism3

Questions

Coding

“Would you say that [country]’s
cultural life is generally enriched or
undermined by people coming to live
here from other countries?”

1-10 Scale
1 = Cultural life undermined
10 = Cultural life enriched

“Is [country] made a worse or a better
place to live by people coming to live
here from other countries?”

1-10 Scale
1 = Worse Place
10 = Better Place

“On the whole, how satisfied are you
with the way democracy works in
[country]?”

0-10 Scale
0 = Extremely Dissatisfied
10 = Extremely Satisfied

“Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how
much you personally trust… political
parties?”

0-10 Scale
0 = No Trust at All
10 = Complete Trust

“Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how
much you personally trust…
politicians?”

0-10 Scale
0 = No Trust at All
10 = Complete Trust

“Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how
much you personally trust… the
police?”

0-10 Scale
0 = No Trust at All
10 = Complete Trust

Only one question was included for authoritarianism, because as a category, these questions did not correlate as
strongly with the other Right-Wing Populist categories. After beginning with three authoritarianism
questions, this study narrowed the questions down to one to include in the index, with the chosen question being the
one that correlated the most strongly with the questions from the Anti-elitism and nativisism categories.
Interestingly, the authoritarianism questions all correlated strongly with each other, which presents an opportunity
for further research.
3

115

Appendix B: Independent Variable: Socioeconomic Integration Score
Questions Included in Socioeconomic Integration Score
Category

Question

Coding

Economic

“On the whole, how satisfied
are you with the present state
of the economy in [country]?”

0-10 Scale
0 = Extremely Dissatisfied
10 = Extremely Satisfied

“Of every 100 people of
working age in [country] how
many would you say are
unemployed and looking for
work?”

Social

“Generally speaking, would
you say that most people can
be trusted, or that you can't be
too careful
in dealing with people?”

1: 50 or more
2: 49-45
3: 44-40
4: 39-35
5: 34-30
6: 29-25
7: 24-20
8: 19-15
9: 14-10
10: 9-5
11: 4-0
0-10 Scale
0 = You can’t be too careful
10 = Most people can be
trusted

“How often do you meet
1: Never
socially with friends, relatives 2: Less than once a month
or work colleagues?”
3: Once a month
4: Several times a month
5: Once a week
6: Several times a week
7: Every day
Cultural

“What do you think overall
about the state of education in
[country] nowadays?”

0-10 Scale
0 = Extremely Bad
10 = Extremely Good
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Appendix C: Control Variables
Control Variable

Measure

Expected Direction

Income

By Decile

+/-*

Age

Respondent self-reported age

+/-*

Gender

0=Female
1=Male

+

Ideology

0-10
0= Far Left
10=Far Right

+

Education

0= Tertiary or Above
1=Under Tertiary

+

Urban vs. Non-Urban

0= Urban
1= Non-Urban

+

*+/- indicates that the literature is uncertain as to if the expected relationship should be positive
or negative.
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